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The mean-varianceframework has been usedto analyze
the effects of bank capital regulation on the asset and
bankruptcy riskofinsured, utility-maximizing banks. This
literature claims that more stringent capital regulation
will increase asset risk andcan increase bankruptcy risk.
These conclusionsare notable becausethey are oppositeto
those obtained for insured, value-maximizing banks. In
thispaper, we show that the utility-maximization literature
does not support its conclusions regarding the effects of
bank capital regulation because it has mischaracterized
the bank's investment opportunity set by neglecting the
option value ofdeposit insurance.
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In recent years, federal bank regulatory agencies have
increased reliance on bank capital regulation, in part,
because of heightened concerns over the risk exposure of
the deposit insurance system. Indeed, the primary ra-
tionale for existing capital regulations, as well as proposals
for more stringent capital regulation, is to reduce the
insurance system's risk exposure by reducing leverage.
The idea that capital and other restrictions might be
needed by liability holders in general to protectthemselves
from equity holders has been discussed extensively in the
theoretical corporate finance literatl:re. For example, Jen-
sen and Meckling (1976), modeling the equityofafirm as a
call option on its assets, show that equity holders have an
incentive to increase the non-systematic risk ofassets once
debt has been issued orto issue additional debt. The reason
is that increasing asset risk or issuing new debt increases
the value of their option on the firm's assets and hence
decreases the value of outstanding debt. As a result,
bondholders often impose covenants constraining such
things as future debt issues, dividend payments, and
leverage.
In banking, the interests ofthe deposit insurance system
parallel those ofa private bondholder because the deposit
insurance system, not the insureddepositors, stands to lose
in the event of a bank failure. In this vein, regulatory
capital requirements and other portfolio restrictions could
be viewed as similar to private bond covenants. 1
It is within this context that a number of articles have
analyzed the need for bank regulation. One strand ofthe
literature has shown that when deposit insurance under-
prices risk, banks seeking to maximize the value oftheir
stockholders' equity will attempt to maximize the value of
the insurance subsidy by increasing asset risk and leverage
(see Sharpe 1978, Kareken and Wallace 1978, and Dothan
and Williams 1980). The reason is that the option value
of deposit insurance increases as leverage or asset risk
increases (see Merton 1977). As a result, with fixed-rate
deposit insurance both capital and asset portfolio reg-
ulation are needed to limit the liability of the deposit
insurance fund.
Moreover, as we have shown elsewhere (Furlong and
Keeley 1989), the marginal value ofthe deposit insurance
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leverage declines. Consequently, value-maximizing banks
would have less ofan incentive to increase asset risk as a
result of more stringent capital regulation. Thus, more
stringentcapitalregulation will reduce the riskexposure of
the insurance system as long as the stringency of the
regulation ofassetportfolio riskremains unchanged. (That
is, as long as the resources devoted to enforcing, and the
penaltiesfor evading, asset regulations remain unchanged,
more stringent capitalregulation will cause the probability
ofbank failure to decline.)
In contrast, another strand ofthe literature focusing on
utility-maximizing banks questions the effectiveness of
capital regulation. The original contributions to this litera-
ture perhaps are best typified by Kahane (1977) and Koehn
and Santomero (1980), hereafter referred to as KKS.
Moreover, the basic framework developed by KKS con-
tinues to be used, as in the work of Kim and Santomero
(1988) and others.2 KKS claim to show that, in the context
of a Markowitz two-parameter portfolio model, more
stringent bank capital regulation will cause a utility-
maximizingbankowner-managerto increase assetrisk and
may, as a result, increase the risk ofbank failure (and thus
implicitly increase the expected liability ofthe deposit in-
surance fund).3 These results are notable in large part be-
cause they run counterto the general finance literature and
suggest that capital regulation may be counterproductive.4
In this paper, we show that KKS's use ofthe Markowitz
two-parameter portfolio model to analyze the effects of
bankcapital regulationonbankruptcyriskis inappropriate
because ofthe model's assumption ofconstant borrowing
rates and costs independent of portfolio (default) risk. 5
While this assumption is appropriate for certain invest-
ment decisions where the probability of bankruptcy (de-
fault on debt) is zero or can be ignored, it is logically
inconsistent to use it to analyze the effects ofbank capital
regulation on bankruptcy risk.
First, in a world without deposit insurance when the
probabilityofbankruptcyis nonzero, the promiseddeposit
rate demanded by uninsured depositors will depend on the
risk of the bank's portfolio, which in turn depends on
leverage and assetrisk. Also, ifdefault is possible, the cost
ofdeposits will be a random variable. Moreover, ifdeposi-
tors are risk-averse, the expected cost of deposits (per
dollar) will rise with risk. Thus, the models ofKKS, which
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assume constant borrowing rates and costs, are not appli-
cable to uninsured banks.
Second, and more importantly, while it might appear
thatthe Markowitz assumptionofconstantborrowingcosts
employed by KKS is applicable to insured banks since
insured depositors will supply funds at a constant risk-free
promised rate, we show below that it is not. 6 The reason is
that the expected net marginal cost (expected interest cost
plus an assumed fixed-rate premium) of deposits (per
dollar) to the bank declines as the quantity of deposits
increases, because the option value ofthe deposit guaran-
tee increases as leverage increases. In effect, KKS confuse
the expected cost ofdeposits with the promised return un-
der situations where the probability ofdefault is nonzero.
By assuming that changes in the probability of bank
failure do not affect depositrates orcosts, KKSmischarac-
terize the risk-return tradeoff even for a bankwith fixed-
rate deposit insurance by neglectingchanges in the value of
the insurance subsidy thatoccurwhen leverage orassetrisk
changes and by using an inappropriate measure of risk
when bankruptcy is possible. These oversights are crucial
since limiting the deposit insurance subsidy is the main
reason for capital requirements in the first place. 7
In Section I we first construct a prototype ofthe Mark-
owitz portfolio model used by KKS to analyze the effectof
bank capital regulation on asset risk. We show that when
bankruptcy is not possible, and, thus, when there is no
deposit insurance subsidy, the results from ourprototypical
model parallel those of KKS regarding the effects of
capital regulation on increasing asset risk. However, in-
creases in asset risk due to more stringent capital regula-
tion cannot increase the probability of bankruptcy under
the assumptions that KKS use to derive the model since
these assumptions imply thatthe probability ofbankruptcy
must be zero.
InSectionII, we demonstrate thataccounting for deposit
insurance and the possibility of bankruptcy markedly
changes the bank's opportunity set. Moreover, the variance
of return no longer adequately characterizes risk. As a
result, KKS mischaracterize the risk-returntradeoffabsent
capital regulation as well as the effect ofcapital regulation
on the risk-return tradeoff when bankruptcy is possible or
when deposit insurance is subsidized. Because of this,
KKS's model cannot be used to support their results.
Section III presents our summary and conclusions.
41I. A Prototypical Model ofan Uninsured Bank's Portfolio Decisionmaking
(2)
(4)
KKS analyze bank risk-taking as a portfolio manage-
mentproblemfor arisk-aversebankowner-managerwhose
entire net worth is invested in the bank. The owner-
manager'sequity risk depends on the bank's assetportfolio
risk and on leverage. We assume that, in the absence of
regulation, banks will leverage only efficient asset port-
folios (those with maximum expected return for any given
level ofrisk). 8 Given the owner's preferences towards risk,
expected utility will be maximized subject to a constraint
thatrelates the gross expectedreturn (one plus the expected
rate ofreturn) on capital, E(Z), to the standarddeviation of
that return, a(Z).
To derive this risk-return constraint, we assume that the
bank'sdeposits are not insured but that the bankcan attract
deposits at a fixed promised deposit rate unrelated to the
bank's risk. This implies that the bank has to choose a
combination ofleverage and assetrisk to make bankruptcy
impossible (that is, the realized return on assets will be
such that the promised obligations to depositors always
will be met). Withbankruptcynot possible, the gross return
on capital, Z, is given by the gross return on assets, AoP,
minus the promised (which equals the actual) obligation to
liability holders, LoR, divided by initial capital, Ko, or
Z





Lo initial liabilities (deposits),
Ko initial capital,
P gross return on the bank's pqrtfolio of assets,
assumed to be random, which equals one plus the
rate ofreturn,
Z = gross return on capital, which is random, which
equals one plus the rate ofreturn,
R promised (which equals actual) gross certain re-
turn paid on (and per dollar cost of) liabilities,
which equals one plus the rate ofreturn.
(1) may be rewritten by noting that Lo Ao - Koto give
Ao Z = [K ] [P - R] + R.
o
The expected gross return on capital, E(Z), may be found
bytaking expected values ofboth sides of(2). As long as R
is fixed and not random, which it would be as long as
bankruptcy were not possible, this gives:
A
(3) E(Z) = [ / ] [E(P) - R] + R.
o
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Thus, increasing leverage, as measured by the asset-to-
capital ratio, increases the owner's expected return on
capital linearly when default is not possible for any given
asset portfolio.
Similarly, the standarddeviation ofthe returnon capital,
a(Z), may be derived from (2). When bankruptcy is not
possible, the covariance ofRand P is zero and
Ao a(Z) = [K ]a(P).
o
so that the standard deviation of return on capital also
varies linearly with leverage for a given asset portfolio.
(3) and (4) may be jointly solved to eliminate the
[Ao/Ko]term to give
(5) E(Z) = [ :~~~ ] [E(P) - R] + R
Inotherwords, the expected(gross) return on capital varies
linearly with the standard deviation ofreturn on capital for
a given expected asset return and asset standard deviation.
This is a standardresult inthe CAPMmodels ofthe finance
literature on investment (see Sharpe 1970).
In general, it is assumed that a bank faces a variety of
different assetportfolio risk-return combinations (the asset
risk-return frontier). Asset portfolios with more risk are
assumed to yield largerexpected returns and thus the asset
risk-return frontier is convex (see Figure 1). Moreover, itis
assumed that the banking sector is small enough that the
asset risk-return frontier is unaffected by banks' behavior.
Thus, the frontier is taken as given by banks in their
optimizing decisions.
An unconstrained bank's efficient investment frontier
consists of linear combinations of a particular asset port-
folio andthe singlerisk-free liability. As is well known (see
Hirshleifer 1970, chap. 10, orFamaandMiller1972, chap.
7), the most efficient asset portfolio is the one where a line
from the constant (gross) borrowing rate, R, is tangent to
the asset risk-return frontier. (This is depicted as point
E(po), a(Po) in Figure 1.) By leveraging this asset port-
folio the bankcan obtain the highest expected return on its
capital for any degree ofrisk. Since this tangency at point
E(Po), a(Po) does not depend on the bank owner's risk
preferences, the asset portfoliochosendepends only on the
risk-free interest rate and the asset risk-return frontier.
An unconstrained bank's optimal position on this linear
investment (or capital) risk-return frontier is the point at
which the marginal rate of substitution between risk and
expected return, da2(Z)/dE(Z) IU= (j, is equated with the
tradeoff between risk and expected return along the effi-
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cient investment portfolio frontier. Following Koehn and
Santomero, assuming the distribution ofportfolio returns
(Z) is symmetric (as it would be for a diversified portfolio
inwhichbankruptcywas notpossible), andtakinga second
order Taylor-series expansion of the utility function, V,
around the initial capital, Ko, ofthe bank, and then taking
expected values gives:
(6) E(V) = V(Ko) +
V'(Ko){E(Z) - b[(E(Z))2 + <r2(Z)2]}
where
V"(Ko)Ko
b = - 2V'(Ko)
is the coefficientofrelative risk aversion ofthe underlying
utility function and V' and V" are the first and second
derivatives ofV. Forthis utility function the marginal rate
ofsubstitution is:
d(<r2(Z)) 1
d(E(Z)) I U=(; = b - 2E(Z) = MRS.
Thus, the optimalportfoliorequires thatMRS = A, whereA
is the tradeoffbetween variance andexpectedreturn onthe
efficient investment frontier. Thus, the degree of leverage
chosen is determined by the owner's risk preferences,
although the assumption is that the unconstrained bank
wouldchoosea degreeofleverage for whichbankruptcy is
not possible.
When capital constraints are imposed, the bank owner
generallywillbeable to increase utility by leveragingasset
portfolios with more risk than the one characterized bythe
parameters E(P0) and <r(P0). The reason is that a binding
capital constraint changes the shape and location of the
capital risk-return frontier, making it convex once the
constraint becomes binding. The capital risk-return fron-
tier under binding capital regulation is convex because it
represents a linearmappingofthe assetrisk-returnfrontier
which is assumed convex.9
In Figure 1, the effect of such a binding capital con-
straint on the capital risk-return frontier is depicted. As
Koehn andSantomero pointout, a reduction inpermissible
leverage reduces expectedreturnoncapital andinvestment
risk overthe entire constrained frontier for any given asset
portfolio. Moreover, Ais largeron the constrained frontier.
Thus, if a binding capital constraint were imposed on a
previously unconstrained bank (at VO), the bank would
choose a more risky asset portfolio (andmove to VI). (The
bank could have chosen a less or equally risky asset
portfolio when not constrained, but did not, which pre-
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43should be emphasized that this result of an unambiguous
increase in asset risk depends critically on the assumption
that capital regulation alters the bank's risk-return frontier
from a linear to a convex constraint, thereby increasing "-
and reducing expected return on capital. However, as we
demonstrate in the next section, in the absence of capital
regulation the capitalrisk-return frontier ofabank that can
fail is not linear; nor does leverage have a linear effect on
risk and return.10
The effects offurther reducing leverage through regula-
tion are ambiguous, however, and depend on the shape of
the bank's (owner's) utility function. The case depicted in
Figure I is one with constant relative risk aversion, where
increasing the stringency of capital regulation (lowering
the permissible degree of leverage) leads the bank to
choose a more risky and higher-return asset portfolio (by
moving to U2).1I This result too, however, depends crit-
ically on the assumption that leverage affects the risk-
return frontier linearly-a result that does not hold for
banks that can fail.
This basic result ofincreased asset risk caused by more
stringent capital regulation is one result emphasized by
KKS. More important is their claim that the increased
assetriskcausedbymore stringentcapitalregulationcould
increase the probability of bank failure and thus could be
counterproductive. However, underthe constantborrowing
costassumption they use to derive theirmodel, an increase
in assetrisk due to more stringentcapital regulation cannot
affect the probability offailure, which remains zero.
The reason is that the probability offailure must be zero
inorderfor borrowing costs to beconstantandfor the effect
of leverage on risk and return to be linear. As we show
below, neither insured nor uninsured banks that can fail
have constantborrowing costs, andthus there is not alinear
effect of leverage on risk and return as KKS suppose.
Moreover, with underpriced deposit insurance, the capital
frontier may be nonconvex. Thus, KKS's model is not
applicable to assessing the effects ofcapital regulation on
the probability ofbankruptcy. In the next section we show
how the constraint changes and why KKS's analysis of
capital regulation is inappropriate when a nonzero proba-
bility ofbankruptcy and deposit insurance are introduced.
the promised gross rate on deposits,
the probability density function ofP,
[Lo/Ao]R, which is the lowest asset return for
which depositors are repaid in full, thatis, when





II. Introducing Bankruptcy and Deposit Insurance
The analysis above, which is consistent with KKS, liabilities. The value ofthe option (per dollar ofdeposits)
assumes that a bank always would mak.e asset and leverage increases as leverage (deposits) increases, butits price (per
choices such that bankruptcy could not occur. Such a bank dollarofdeposits) is fixed. This increase in the option's net
could attract deposits at the risk-free rate because it always value, in effect, lowers the expected marginal cost of
would make the payments promised regardless of the deposits. As a result, the expected cost of deposits to the
return on assets realized. Consequently, the cost ofdepos- bank is less than the risk-free rate plus the deposit insur-
its (per dollar) to such a bank would equal the promised ance premium. Moreover, the expected cost of deposits is
risk-free deposit rate and would not be a random variable not independent ofthe bank's asset portfoliorisk-infact,
so that the capital risk-return frontier in the absence of the expected cost of deposits also declines as asset port-
capital regulation would be linear. folio risk increases because the net value of the deposit
In the absence of deposit insurance a bank's expected insurance option also increases as asset risk increases.
borrowing cost would rise as leverage (and thereby the To demonstrate how the deposit insurance guarantee
probability ofbankruptcy) increases ifdepositors are risk- affects the risk-return tradeoff, itis assumedthat aminimal
averse. Thus, leverage does not have a linear effect on risk form of capital regulation is in place (a bank owner must
and return for uninsured banks that can fail. invest his or her entire net worth in the bank), and that the
More importantly, even with fixed-rate deposit insur- deposit insurance premium is zero. 13 ,14 The expected
ance (under which a bank could attract deposits at a gross return on capital, then, is given by:
promised risk-free rate even though bankruptcy is pos- 00 A P - L R
sible), the per dollar deposit cost is random and the (8) E(Z) t [ 0 K
o
0 ] f(P) dP,
expected perdollar cost ofdeposits to the bank would vary
with default risk and would no longer be equal to the
promised risk-free deposit rate plus the deposit insurance
premiumrate. 12 As a result, leverage would not have linear
effects on risk and return. The reason is that a fixed-rate
deposit insurance guarantee represents an option to the
bank to put the bank's assets to the insuring agency at a
striking price equal to the promised maturity value of its
44 Economic Review / Summer 1991(8) indicates that the expectedgross return oncapitalis the
expectedvalueofgross assetreturns minus liabilityobliga-
tions, conditional on nonbankruptcy. (If P < P*, bank-
ruptcy occurs and the gross return on capital is zero.) (8)
can be rewritten by adding and subtracting the same term
to give:
(9)
00 A P-L R
E(Z) = I [ 0 K 0 ]f(P)dP
-00 0
P* A P-L R I [ 0 K 0 J!(P)dP.
-00 0
ance is the sum ofthe expectedreturn positedby KKS plus
the expected return ofthe option. Below, the implications
of these changed relationships for the·effects of bank
capital regulation on the relationship betweenleverage and
expected return are explored.
Following Merton (1977), under the stochastic assump-
tions employed by Black and Scholes (1973), the value of
the integral neglected by KKS-the option value of de-
posit insurance per dollar ofcapital invested-is:
LoF(aVt- x) - AoF(-x)
(11) 10 = v '
1\.0
p* [R P] I - f(P)dP
-00 Ko
Noting that Lo = Ao - Ko and taking the integral ofthe
first term of (9) and rearranging terms in the second
integral gives:
Note that the first term of(10) in braces is identical to the
right-hand side of (3), the formula for the expected gross
returns on capital of a bank that cannot go bankrupt.
However, the second term of(10) represents an integration
over bankruptcy states of the obligations to depositors in
excess of returns on assets, which, by definition, are
positive in eachbankruptcy state (since ifP < P*, LoR -
AoP > 0). The value of this integral, however, depends
positively on leverage. (That is, the derivative of the




log ( ~ ) + (2 )
aVt
= the current value of insured deposits, which earn
the risk-free interest rate and are assumed to
constitute all deposits,
= the current value ofassets (excluding the value of
the insurance option),
= the standard deviation of the rate of return on
assets, which is the measure ofrisk,




F() = the standard normal cumulative density function.
First, consider how the value of the option varies with
leverage, holding initial capital constant. (We chose this
method ofvarying leverage since it corresponds to KKS's
assumption that the bank owner's capital is fixed.) Using
the results in Jarrow and Rudd (1983),
dlo I _ alo alo 1
(12) dLo
Ko - [ aLo + aLo ] [ Ko ]
1
[F(aVt- x) - F(-x)] [K ]> O.
o
That is, increasing deposits, holding capital constant,
increases the option value ofdeposit insurance. Moreover,
the second derivate of 1 0 with respect to Lo is positive.
x
10 the value of the option per dollar of capital in-
vested, which equals
p* L R - A P I [ 0 K 0 ]f(P)dP,
00 0
p* L R-A P
+ I [ 0 K 0 ]f(P)dP.
-00 0
A
E(Z) = ([ K
O ][E(P) R] + R}
o
(10)
which is positive since R > P for P < P*.) This means
that the cost of an additional dollar of deposits holding
equity constant (which increases leverage), is not R, but is
R minus the increase in the value ofthe integral.
This secondtermof(10), the expectedvalue (conditional
onbankruptcy) ofthe obligations to depositors inexcess of
returnsonassets perdollarofinvestedcapital, corresponds
to the option value of deposit insurance as described by
Merton (1977). This is the term that is neglected by both
Kahane and Koehn and Santomero. By neglecting the
option value of deposit insurance per dollar of invested
capital, the linear relationship between expected return
and leverage assumed by KKS no longer holds, nor does
the linear relationship between risk and leverage. 15 In
effect, the expected return on capital with deposit insur-
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+ F'(x)'\/"t][K] > 0
o
(which is positive because F"(x) < 0, dx/dLo < 0 and
F'(x»O). (15) implies that the gain from increased risk-
taking is not independent of leverage as KKS assume.l7
Thus, the overall expected return increases more rapidly
and nonlinearly with leverage than the linear relationship
posited by KKS, thereby making the relation between
leverage and expected return nonconvex. Because ofthis,
risk-aversion would no longer necessarily constrain bank
risk-taking. In fact, as we have shown elsewhere (Furlong
and Keeley 1987), for a binomial asset return distribution,
as long as the bank owner is willing to risk bankruptcy,
absent regulation, optimal leverage is infinite even though
the bank owner is risk-averse. 16
Moreover, consider how the expected return varies with
increased asset portfolio risk. The value of the option
varies with asset risk as
dIo Ao'\/"tF'(x)
(14) da - K
o
> O.
Thus, independent of the positive market relationship
between asset risk and return presumedby KKS, the value
ofthe option also increases with assetrisk, thereby chang-
ing the shape of the capital risk-return frontier holding
leverage constant. Thatis, the capital risk-return frontier is
no longer a linearmapping ofthe asset risk-return frontier.
Finally, as we have pointed out elsewhere (Furlong and
Keeley, 1989), thegainfrom increasedrisk-taking (interms






As the above results demonstrate, the relationship be-
tween expected return, leverage and asset risk is straight-
forward, but the relationship between true capital risk and
return is not. Although the variance ofZ under subsidized
depositinsuranceis easilycalculated,a(Z)aloneno longer
adequately characterizes risk for the bank owner when
bankruptcy is possible. Specifically, it is well known that
variance alone is an unreliable measure of risk for trun-
cated, skewed distributions such as that ofZ when bank-
ruptcy is possible. Since the equity of the bank is a call
optionon its assets at a strikingprice equal to the promised
maturity value of the deposits, the return on equity will
be positively skewed. As Cox and Rubinstein (1985,
pp. 317-342) show, for utility functions with constant
proportional risk-aversion, expected utility depends on the
skewness as well as the meanandvarianceofthe return. By
neglecting the skewness of the return distribution, KKS
mischaracterizethe shapeofthe capitalrisk-returntradeoff
absent capital regulation and how that shape is affected by
leverage and capital regulation.
Thus, KKS's analysis does not demonstrate that more
stringent capital regulation would lead a utility-maximiz-
ing bank with fixed-rate deposit insurance to take on more
asset risk. Moreover, from the analysis above, risk-aver-
sion alone will not necessarily be sufficient to limit lever-
age and asset risk as is concluded by KKS. As a result,
KKS's analysis cannot support their claim that more
stringent capital regulation will be counterproductive for
bank owners with certain preference structures. For exam-
ple, Furlong and Keeley (1987) demonstrate that for a
binomial asset return distribution, the probability ofbank-
ruptcy declines as the stringency of capital regulation is
increased as long as the stringency of asset portfolio risk
regulation remains unchanged regardless of the bank
owner's preference structure.
III. Summary and Conclusions
Two inconsistentstrandsofthe finance literaturecome to In this paper we show that the KKS model does not
opposite conclusions regarding the effects of capital reg-supportits claimedresults. KKS apply the Markowitztwo-
ulation on bank risk-taking. On the one hand, the options parameter portfolio model to analyze bank risk-taking
literature suggests that for risk-neutral or value-maximiz- undera nonzero probability ofbankruptcy inappropriately.
ing banks capital regulation will reduce the risk exposure Specifically they neglect the option value of the deposit
ofthe deposit insurance system underagiven stringency of insurance subsidy and use an inappropriate measure of
asset regulation. On the other hand, the utility-maximiza- risk, thereby mischaracterizing both the risk-return fron-
tion literature utilizing the Markowitz two-parameterport- tierabsentcapitalregulation and the shift in the risk-return
folio model, as typifiedbyKKS, claims that forrisk-averse frontier due to capital regulation. Because of these over-
banks more stringent capital regulation may increase the sights, the models used by KKS are not applicable to
probability of bank failure (and hence implicitly the risk analyzing the effects of bank capital regulation on asset
exposure of the insurance system) and thus be coun- risk and cannot be used to support their results.
terproductive.
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1. See Black, Miller, and Posner (19.78) for a discussion of
why bank regulation is analogous to the contractual en-
forcement of private lending agreements by private debt-
holders.•Black, Miller, and Posner also argue, but do not
formally prove, that the less capital the bank has, the
greater its incentives for risk-taking. As aresult, they call
for more stringent capital requirements to protect the
insurance fund.
2. Also, see articles by Wall (1985), Lam and Chen (1985)
and Hanweck (1985).
3. As Koehn and Santomero (1980, p. 1244) put it, "In fact,
a case could be argued that the opposite result can be
expected to that which is desired when higher capital
requirements are imposed."
4. Although Kahane and Koehn and Santomero conclude
that both capital and asset regulation are necessary, as
does the value-maximizing literature typified by Sharpe,
Kareken and Wallace, and Dothan and Williams, it is
important torecognize that KKS's models cannot support
this conclusion. (It is true that, under the assumption of
value maximization, both capital and asset regulation are
needed to limit the liability of the deposit insurance sys-
tem.) KKS claim that both capital and asset regulation are
needed because more stringent capital regulation leads
to greater asset portfolio risk, which in turn can increase
the probabilityoffailure. However, as we show later, KKS's
models cannot be used to show that more stringent reg-
ulation will lead to an increased probability of failure.
5. Koehn and Santomero explicitly assume a constant
deposit rate and corresponding constant borrowing cost
per dollar of liabilities. Similarly, Kahane, following Hart
and Jaffee (1974), assumes that the deposit rate is sto-
chastic but unrelated to the bank's portfolio risk. For
example, Kahane (1977, p. 209) states that "... the dis-
tributions of the random variables (the returns on assets
and liabilities) must be exogenously given and indepen-
dent of the value of the vector x (the portfolio alloca-
tion)... " (parenthetical statements added).
6. In private correspondence Anthony Santomero indi-
cated that the Koehn and Santomero model was properly
interpreted as applying to insured banks. Moreover, the
more recent Kim and Santomero (1988) model specifically
is claimed to apply to insured banks.
7. It should be noted that the analysis of KKS is not
applicable to uninsured banks either. To analyze unin-
sur(:')d banks, one. would have to account for the increase
in expected borrowing costs as bank risk increased and
the variance of deposit returns increased, which would
result from the behavior of risk-averse depositors.
8. See Merton (1972) for a discussion of how quadratic
programming can be used to solve for the efficient asset
portfolio.
9.To derive the shape of the capital risk-return frontier,
the risk-return combination resulting from leveraging each
asset portfolio to the maximum degree allowed may be
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
traced out. As (3) and (4) show, both expected return,
E(Z), and risk, Ri , are linear functions ofleverage. Thus,
the risk and return on capital foragiven assetportfolioand
leverage canb(:')found geometrically by extending a ray
from the constant borrowing rate through the particular
asset portfolio up to the maximum leverage allowed. The
locus of such points is the constrained capital risk-return
frontier. Also, note that a particular point on a capital risk-
return frontier has greater ass(:')t risk than anotherpointon
the same orOn a different frontier iftheslope ofa line from
Rthrough th(:')point is smaller.
10. Although the shape of the risk-return frontier depends
on whetherthe bank's deposits are insured at afixed rate,
neither insured nor uninsured frontiers are linear.
11. Foraformal proofsee Koehn and Santomero(1980).
12. An anonymous referee noted that once it is realized
that the deposit rate (from the bank's perspective) is
random, the nonlinearity of the investment frontier is self-
evident since it is simply a combination of positive and
negative risky assets. While this is true, our point is that a
fixed-rate deposit insurance guarantee alters the risk-
return frontier in a specific way so as to subsidize risk-
taking.
13. The assumption implicit in the utility maximization
framework is that a (potential) bank owner has an ex-
ogenously given initial capital (wealth) Ko, all of which
must be invested in the bank in order to obtain deposit
insurance. However, this assumption implies some form of
capital regulation since a risk-averse bank owner gener-
ally would prefer to segregate his capital (and make a
relatively safe investment) and start abankwith no capital,
thereby acqUiring an option of potentially unlimited value.
This suggests that the utility-maximization model may not
be applicable to many actual banks since even owners of
small banks have limited liability, and, absent capital
regulation, would not have to risk all of their own funds. It
also suggests that this limited form of capital regulation
must reduce the probability of bank failure-a result
opposite to KKS.
14. Since we are interested in fixed-rate deposit insur-
ance systems, the analysis ofazero-premium rate system
is essentially the same as a positive fixed-rate system.
15. With fixed-rate deposit insurance, a more risky asset
portfolio, even if it has the same expected return, in-
creases the expected return on capital because the op-
tion value of deposit insurance increases. Similarly, by
increasing leverage, the owner can increase without limit
the expected return on capital as long as some part of the
asset distribution exceedsthe promised rate. Underthese
circumstances, even if the expepted rat(:') on assets were
less than the promised rate on deposits, a bank with
underpriced deposit insurance would gain from lev(:')rage.
This is in sharp contrast to the results without deposit
insurance when bankruptcy is not possible. In that case,
leverage can increase expected return only if the ex-
pected return on assets exceeds the expected cost of
47deposits (see (3)). Thus, the provision of underpriced
deposit insurance can cause risk-averse bank owners to
assume more risky portfolios.
16. Rationality implies that a lotterythat costs $1 and pays
$100 with a 50 percent chance and $0 with a 50 percent
chance will be preferred to one that also costs $1 but pays
$10 with a 50 percent chance and $0 with a 50 percent
chance, even though the variance of the first lottery's
outcomes is higher. Thus, for some asset distributions,
such as the binomial, abank owner's true risk is limited (for
sufficiently high leverage there is a constant probability,
which is invariant with greater leverage and is less than
one, that he will lose his capital), but his (certain) return if
failure does not occur (and thus his expected return) is
unlimited as leverage increases. (That is, as leverage
increases, end-of-period capital increases without limit as
long as bankruptcy does not occur and is zero if bank-
ruptcy does occur, See Furlong and Keeley (1987, p. 39)
for a more detailed discussion.)
Thus, even a risk-averse bank owner (willing to risk
bankruptcy in return for a sufficiently high payoff) might
prefer unlimited leverage. A similar result applies to asset
risk. In contrast, KKS argue that risk-aversion necessarily
limits bankrisk-taking. While this may be the case in the
absence of subsidized deposit insurance, it need not be
so with subsidized deposit insurance. It may be the case
that even a risk-averse bank owner-manager will try to
maximize the option value of deposit insurance. Thus, in
general it is not meaningful to analyze the effects ofcapital
regulation absent asset regulation as do KKS.
17.(15) also implies that, for value-maximizing banks,
more stringent capital regulation will reduce the risk ex-
posure of the deposit insurance system as long as the
stringency of asset portfolio regulation is not reduced.
See Furlong and Keeley (1989) for a more complete
discussion.
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